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INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”)1 to protect participants and beneficiaries of private
employee benefit plans. ERISA imposes strict duties upon those who
manage benefit plans and their assets.2 Although these people—
otherwise known as “fiduciaries”—are held accountable for breaching
their obligations, the statute makes no reference as to whether
fiduciaries can seek contribution or indemnification from others when
found liable for breaching their duties.3 This is important because if
such rights are not implied, then breaching fiduciaries may sustain

* J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012).
2
Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
general/topic/health-plans/fiduciaryresp (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).
3
Contribution apportions liability among joint tortfeasors by requiring each to
pay his proportionate share, whereas indemnification shifts the entire liability from
one tortfeasor to another who should bear it instead. Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 866 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ill. 2007).
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liability unequal to their share of wrongdoing.4 To date, federal courts
of appeal are split as to whether contribution and indemnification
should be allowed as equitable remedies under ERISA.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the history and purpose of
ERISA. Part I then presents the issue of whether ERISA co-fiduciaries
can seek indemnification and contribution as equitable remedies in
light of their statutory roles, duties, and liabilities. Part II analyzes the
circuit split pertaining to this statutory issue. Part III then examines the
recent Seventh Circuit decision in Chesemore v. Fenkell5 both
factually and procedurally. Finally, Part IV argues that the Seventh
Circuit got its decision wrong when it held the district court had the
authority to provide indemnification and contribution to co-fiduciaries.
ERISA BACKGROUND
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Studebaker automobile
company was struggling to compete against the Big Three in the
United States automotive industry.6 In an attempt to save the company,
Studebaker increased the pension benefits7 it was promising to its
employees on several occasions; however, Studebaker was unable to
sustain these contributions.8 By the end of 1963, Studebaker ceased its
automotive operations and terminated its pension plan, leaving more
than 4300 workers and retirees without the pension benefits they had

4

Elizabeth A. Di Cola, Fairness and Efficiency: Allowing Contribution Under
ERISA, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1543, 1543 (1992).
5
829 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016).
6
Roger Lowenstein, The Long, Sorry Tale of Pension Promises, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 1, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323308504579085220604114220?mg=id-wsj.
7
“A pension plan is a retirement plan that requires an employer to make
contributions into a pool of funds set aside for a worker’s future benefit. The pool of
funds is invested on the employee’s behalf, and the earnings on the investments
generate income to the worker upon retirement.” Pension Plan, INVESTOPEDIA
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pensionplan.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
8
Lowenstein, supra note 6.
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been promised.9 The collapse of the Studebaker automobile company
subsequently pushed Congress to undertake pension reform, which
eventually led to the enactment of ERISA in 1974.10
ERISA is a federal law that establishes minimum regulatory
standards for employee pension benefit plans in the private sector.11
These benefit plans include any plan, fund, or program that is
maintained by an employer to the extent that it defers employees’
income up to their employment termination or beyond.12 This means
that if an employer chooses to provide employee benefits—e.g.,
retirement income, hospital or medical care, vacation benefits, prepaid
legal services, etc.—it generally has to comply with ERISA
regulations and procedures. Notably, ERISA does not cover benefit
plans that are established or maintained by governmental entities,
church plans, or plans that are maintained for the purpose of
complying with workers’ compensation, unemployment, or disability
laws.13 ERISA also does not cover plans that are maintained outside of
the United States for the benefit of non-resident aliens.14
The main goal of ERISA is to protect participants and
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans against fiduciary abuses and
mismanagement.15 Congress attempted to achieve this by subjecting
plan fiduciaries to numerous duties, liabilities, and standards of
conduct.16 As discussed below, analyzing the roles and responsibilities
of a fiduciary will contextually frame the issue of whether cofiduciaries can seek indemnification and contribution as equitable
remedies under ERISA.
9

Terrence Cain, A Primer on the History and Proper Drafting of Qualified
Domestic-Relations Orders, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 432 (2001).
10
Id. at 433 (citing James A Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in
the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 683, 686 (2001)).
11
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
12
Id. § 1002(2)(A).
13
Id. § 1003(b)(1)–(3).
14
Id. § 1003(b)(4)–(5).
15
See generally id. § 1001(a)–(c).
16
Id. § 1001(b).
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Who is A Fiduciary?

ERISA reserves liabilities for both named fiduciaries and
functional fiduciaries. A named fiduciary has the authority to manage
plan operations and is specifically listed as a fiduciary in the plan
documents.17 A functional fiduciary, however, is not listed in the plan
documents. Similar to the authority exercised by a named fiduciary, a
person is a functional fiduciary to the extent that he (i) exercises
discretionary authority or control regarding the management of an
employee benefit plan or the disposition of its assets; (ii) provides
investment advice regarding plan assets for compensation or has any
authority to do so; or (iii) has discretionary authority in the
administration of the plan.18 As fiduciary status is not only determined
by formal designations, courts must carefully evaluate all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the individual’s relationship with the
plan. The key to determining fiduciary status is primarily based on
whether the person exercises discretion over the plan’s assets.19 If an
individual is deemed to be a fiduciary, then he or she will be subject to
numerous duties and liabilities.
B.

Fiduciary Liability

Fiduciaries are subject to various standards of conduct because
they act on behalf of plan participants and beneficiaries.20 These duties
primarily include (1) the duty of loyalty, (2) the duty of prudence, (3)
the duty of diversification, and (4) the duty to follow plan

17

Id. § 1102(a)(2).
Id. § 1002(21)(A).
19
See Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (“Chesemore I”), 886 F. Supp. 2d
1007, 1040 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
20
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 2
(2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/
resource-center/publications/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf.
18
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documents.21 As detailed below, a breach of any of these duties will
generally subject a fiduciary to liability.
1. Duty of Loyalty
A fiduciary’s duty of loyalty consists of acting solely in the
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.22 This duty requires
fiduciaries to act with “complete and undivided loyalty”23 with an “eye
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.”24
Moreover, this duty requires fiduciaries to act for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries, as well
as to settle reasonable expenses for administering the benefit plan.25
Additionally, the duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to avoid placing
themselves in situations where a substantial conflict of interest
between the fiduciary and the participant may arise.26 The classic
example of a fiduciary breaching the duty of loyalty is where the
interests of the employer are at odds with the interests of the
beneficiaries, and the fiduciary subsequently acts in a way that places
the employer’s interests above the beneficiaries—e.g., self-dealing,
acting contrary to the interests of the plan, or kickbacks.27

21

29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (outlining the various fiduciary duties under
ERISA); see Craig C. Martin et al., What’s Up on Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited,
39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 608–609 (2006).
22
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
23
Freund v. Marshall & IIsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
24
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
25
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012).
26
Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (“Chesemore I”), 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007,
1041 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
27
Martin et al., supra note 21, at 608; see 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2012) (describing
transactions that are prohibited between a fiduciary’s plan and a party of interest).
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2. Duty of Prudence
The duty of prudence, otherwise known as the duty of care, is an
objective standard.28 A fiduciary must act with the same care, skill,
prudence, and diligence as an objectively prudent fiduciary acting
under the same circumstances.29 This fiduciary duty is intended to be
very stringent.30 As such, federal courts have generally required plan
fiduciaries to perform adequate investigations related to any
substantive decisions affecting the plan, such as the risks of an
investment, the qualifications of an investment advisor, and all other
facts that would be deemed relevant from an objectively prudent
fiduciary’s point of view.31 Moreover, the duty of care requires a
fiduciary to understand the surrounding facts and circumstances
relevant to the investment plan or the investment course of actions.32 If
a fiduciary lacks the requisite knowledge to assess the prudence of an
investment decision, then the duty of care may require the fiduciary to
hire an independent professional advisor.33 Accordingly, the fiduciary
should ask questions, consider the professional advisor’s suggestions,
and then continue to act prudently when exercising his duty of care.
The completion of a careful and impartial investigation prior to
making an investment decision provides an adequate basis for a
fiduciary’s defense.34

28

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012).
Id.
30
Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More is
Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 71 (1998); see Donovan v. Mazzola, 716
F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the prudent person test under both trust
law and the significance of employee benefits).
31
See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983);
Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 1983); see also, Martin et
al., supra note 21, at 608.
32
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a–1(b)(1)(i) (2016).
33
See id. § 2550.404a–1(b)(3)(i).
34
Leslie L. Wellman & Shari J. Clark, An Overview of Pension Benefit and
Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 665, 695 (1990).
29
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3. Duty of Diversification
Beyond the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, ERISA fiduciaries
must also exercise the duty of diversification.35 This duty requires
fiduciaries to diversify the investments of a benefit plan for the
purpose of minimizing the risk of loss, unless exercising such
authority would violate a fiduciary’s duty of care.36 Although ERISA
does not detail actual percentage limits for fiduciaries to abide by
when diversifying their investments, this duty prohibits fiduciaries
from investing disproportionately in a particular venture.37 A
Congressional Committee report on the Act’s diversification provision
stated:
A fiduciary usually should not invest the whole or an
unreasonable large proportion of the trust property in a single
security. Ordinarily the fiduciary should not invest the whole
or an unduly large proportion of the trust property in one type
of security or in various types of securities dependent upon
the success of one enterprise or upon conditions in one
locality, since the effect is to increase the risk of large
losses.38
Notably, there is no per se violation under the duty of diversification.
Each case depends on its own unique facts and circumstances.39

35

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012).
Id.
37
In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996).
38
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5085).
39
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan
Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013).
36
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4. Duty to Follow Plan Documents
Finally, fiduciaries have a duty to act in accordance with plan
documents insofar as such documents are consistent with ERISA.40 In
other words, fiduciaries cannot implement plan provisions that violate
ERISA. Additionally, every benefit plan must be in writing41 and must
(1) provide a procedure for implementing a funding policy that is
consistent with the plan’s objectives, (2) describe the procedure for
allocating fiduciary responsibilities, (3) identify who can amend the
plan and provide the procedure for amending the plan, and (4) specify
how payments are made to and from the plan.42
C.

Co-Fiduciary Liability

ERISA fiduciaries may also be liable for the actions of other
fiduciaries—otherwise known as “co-fiduciaries.”43 A co-fiduciary can
either be appointed by another fiduciary or appointed by the plan.44 A
fiduciary may be liable for another fiduciary’s breach if the fiduciary
(1) knowingly conceals the other’s breach, (2) enables the other’s
breach, or (3) does not make reasonable efforts to remedy the other’s
breach if he was aware of it.45 As co-fiduciaries are jointly and
severally liable for breaches of duty,46 federal courts encourage ERISA
fiduciaries to take affirmative steps in remedying perceived issues that
are related to plan operations.47 That is, a fiduciary cannot avoid
40

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012).
Id. § 1102(a)(1).
42
Id. § 1102(b)(1)–(4).
43
See id. generally § 1105.
44
AM. BAR ASS’N, ASPECTS FIDUCIARY LIABILITY UNDER ERISA 4 (2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/20
09/ac2009/046.authcheckdam.pdf.
45
29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2012).
46
Id. § 1105(b)(1).
47
See generally Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005)
(Pooler, J., concurring); Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1984).
41
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liability by simply doing nothing in the wake of another’s breach of
duty.48
D.

The Arising Issue: Indemnification and Contribution

The aforementioned provisions establish that fiduciaries are
obliged to act in the best interest of plan participants and are jointly
and severally liable for breaching their duties. Nevertheless, although
ERISA expressly assigns liabilities to plan fiduciaries, the Act is silent
as to whether liabilities may be allocated between two or more
fiduciaries in relation to a single judgment. Section 1132 states that
“[a] civil action may be brought . . . by the Secretary, or by a
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under
Section 1109.”49 Moreover, Section 1109 provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries . . . shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan . . . and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary . . . .50
Based on this language, courts are left to interpret fiduciary
liabilities in light of the phrase “other equitable or remedial relief.”51
48

See, e.g., Free, 732 F.2d at 1336 (trustee of plan was liable under ERISA for
co-fiduciary’s breach where at no time did trustee take any action to determine assets
of plan to asset control over plan assets or to assure that plan assets would be
protected from losses); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 898, 909–
10 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (ERISA fiduciaries who did not allegedly participate in cofiduciaries’ breaches may still be liable if they have knowledge of, but took no action
to prevent, co-fiduciaries’ acts); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 661–62 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (ERISA fiduciaries may be liable for
failing to investigate the propriety of investments of plan funds made by cofiduciaries).
49
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
50
Id. § 1109(a) (emphasis added).
51
Id.
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Although courts have considered whether fiduciaries can seek
indemnification or contribution as equitable remedies, the federal
courts of appeal have taken various and inconsistent positions as to
whether such remedies are available under ERISA. As described
below, this contention is fundamentally based on how courts have
answered the following two questions: (1) when should a right be
implied under a federal statute; and (2) to what degree does ERISA
incorporate common law trust principles.52
1. The Implied Cause of Action Theory
The Supreme Court has recognized a right of contribution under a
federal statute where (1) Congress created an express right of action or
(2) through the power of the federal courts.53 As Congress never
expressly addressed contribution or indemnification under ERISA, the
question is whether this right should be implied through the power of
the federal courts.54 In Cort v. Ash55 the Supreme Court devised a fourpart analysis for determining whether a right can be implied under a
federal statute: (1) whether the party seeking the remedy is a class
member for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is
legislative intent to create or deny the implicit cause of action;
(3) whether the cause of action is consistent with the underlying
purpose of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action
is one traditionally relegated to state law.56
The Supreme Court relied on the aforementioned analysis in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell57 when it
considered whether a fiduciary to an employee benefit plan was liable
52

See Elizabeth A. Di Cola, Fairness and Efficiency: Allowing Contribution
Under ERISA, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1549 (1992).
53
Tx. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981).
54
Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1991).
55
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
56
Id. at 78.
57
473 U.S. 134 (1985).
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to a plan participant for punitive damages caused by improper
handling of benefit claims.58 In Russell, a beneficiary of an employee
benefit plan brought an action to recover damages for improperly
processing her disability benefit claim.59 The beneficiary argued that
the fiduciary deliberately delayed processing her request, thereby
aggravating a psychological condition that caused her back ailment.60
The beneficiary then filed an action against the fiduciary seeking
extra-contractual and punitive damages.61
The Supreme Court held that Section 409 of ERISA62 entitles
claimants to equitable relief, but does not allow parties to recover for
extra-contractual damages.63 Based on ERISA’s statutory language, the
Supreme Court emphasized that a fiduciary’s liability is “to make good
to such plan” for breaching his duties.64 The Court noted that nothing
under ERISA supported the conclusion that a delay in processing a
disability claim gave rise to a right of action for punitive relief.65
Rather, the Court reasoned that the statute’s language only concerned
the misuse of plan assets, as well as remedies that would protect the
plan, not the rights of an individual beneficiary.66 Furthermore, the
Court stated that it was “reluctant to tamper with an enforcement
58

Id. at 136.
Id. at 134.
60
Id. at 136–37.
61
Id.
62
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (“Any person who is a
fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets
of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.”).
63
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
64
Id. at 140 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)).
65
Id. at 144.
66
Id. at 142.
59

216
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.” 67 The
Supreme Court also noted that courts should be cautious about reading
remedies into a statute that Congress deliberately chose not to
include.68
Although the Russell decision suggests that implied remedies
under ERISA are rarely found, the Court never expressly banned
implied remedies beyond extra-contractual or punitive damages. As a
result, the Russell decision stands as a pillar, as well as a point of
contention, for the federal courts of appeal in determining whether cofiduciaries can seek contribution or indemnification under ERISA.
1. The Incorporation of Common Law Trust Principles
A trustee is generally responsible for expenses improperly
incurred by him on behalf of administering a trust.69 In the event two
trustees are liable for a breach of trust, both trustees are entitled to
contribution from the other.70 However, if one of the two trustees is
substantially more at fault than the other, traditional trust law allows
for the trustee who is not substantially more at fault to seek
indemnification from the other.71 In other words, traditional trust law
uses indemnification as a means to fully compensate a paying trustee
where the other trustee is primarily responsible for the breach of
trust.72
The degree in which common law trust principles are incorporated
under ERISA is heavily contested among the federal courts of appeals.
67

Id. at 147.
Id. (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 19 (1979)).
69
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
70
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 258 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). For
example, A and B are trustees for C. Both trustees participate in a breach of trust,
resulting in a $1000 loss to C. If A paid C $1000 for the loss, A would be entitled to
recover $500 from B.
71
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 258 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
72
George Lee Flint, Jr. & Philip W. Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary Has
No Right to Contribution and Indemnity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 7, 9 (2002-2003).
68
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This point of contention is, in part, fueled by ERISA’s legislative
history, which provides that “[t]he fiduciary responsibility
section . . . makes applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.”73 Although these
principles apply to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,74 the duties
of diversification and adherence to plan documents represent new
obligations that have been altered to the needs of benefit plans.75 In
light of such legislative ambiguity, the federal courts of appeal dispute
whether the rights of indemnification and contribution should also be
implied under ERISA based on common law trust principles.
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit was one of the first circuit courts to issue an
opinion supporting indemnification or contribution under ERISA;
however, the court sidestepped analyzing this issue under federal
common law.76 In Free v. Briody,77 the Seventh Circuit addressed
whether ERISA provides indemnification and contribution rights to
fiduciaries.78 This case is an illustrative example of a fiduciary
allowing a co-fiduciary to injure participants of a plan by failing to

73

H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.C. 4639, 4649.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in
the interest of the beneficiary.”).
75
Jay Conison, The Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1990).
76
Stewart H. Thomsen & W. Mark Smith, Developments in Common-Law
Remedies Under ERISA, 27 TORTS & INS. L. J. 750, 756 (1992).
77
732 F.2d 1331 (1984).
78
Id. at 1336.
74
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take action, rendering both fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for
breaching their fiduciary duties.79
Free involved a corporation’s profit-sharing plan and two
trustees.80 At one point, the primary trustee transferred plan assets to a
purported financial adviser after being warned to exercise greater care
over the plan’s assets by the trustee’s accountant.81 The primary trustee
also withdrew securities from the profit-sharing plan to satisfy outside
obligations.82 Throughout the course of these transactions, the cotrustee did not monitor the plan assets and did nothing to protect the
plan from losses.83 Thereafter, both the corporation and the primary
trustee declared bankruptcy and the assets that were transferred to the
financial advisor were never returned to the profit-sharing plan.84 The
co-trustee appealed the district court’s decision, which held (1) both
trustees were jointly and severally liable for the losses incurred by the
profit-sharing plan and (2) denied the co-trustee’s claim for
indemnification against the other fiduciary.85
As for the liability issue, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the cotrustee was jointly and severally liable for the plan’s losses.86 The
court noted that the co-trustee could have easily taken action while the
primary trustee was misappropriating plan assets.87 On the second
question, the Seventh Circuit held that “ERISA grants the courts the
power to shape an award so as to make the injured plan whole while at
the same time apportioning the damages equitably between the
wrongdoers.”88 The courts reading of Section 1109 was based upon

79

See id. at 1333–34.
Id. at 1333.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1331.
86
Id. at 1336.
87
Id. at 1335.
88
Id. at 1337.
80
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ERISA’s legislative history.89 The court noted, “Congress intended to
codify the principles of trust law with whatever alterations were
needed to fit the needs of employee benefit plans.”90 Because the
general principles of trust law provide for indemnification under
certain circumstances, the court was able to extend its holding and
indemnify the primary trustee under ERISA.91
B.

The Ninth Circuit

After the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Circuit was the
first federal court of appeal to definitively rule against allowing cofiduciary indemnification rights under ERISA. In Kim v. Fujikawa,92
Rodney Kim (“Kim”) was an official of the Pacific Electrical
Contractors Association (“PECA”), a multi-employer bargaining
representative.93 PECA entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No.
1186 (“the Union”), which required employers to contribute to a
benefit plan that was jointly administered by Kim and a union
official.94 At one point, the union official improperly withdrew plan
assets to pay Union-related expenses.95 Kim filed an action to recover
all related payments, and the union official sought contribution under
ERISA against Kim.96 The district court held that ERISA did not
provide the union official a right of contribution against Kim, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.97
The Ninth Circuit heavily relied on the Russell decision, holding
that Section 409 of ERISA only establishes remedies for the benefit of
89

Id.
Id. at 1337–38.
91
Id. at 1338.
92
871 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1989).
93
Id. at 1428-29.
94
Id. at 1429.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1432.
90
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a plan.98 “Therefore, this section cannot be read as providing for an
equitable remedy of contribution in favor of a breaching fiduciary.”99
Unlike Free’s broad interpretive reading of ERISA’s legislative
history, the court reasoned there was no indication in ERISA’s
legislative history “that Congress was concerned with softening the
blow on joint wrongdoers.”100 Moreover, the court reasoned that
implying a right of contribution is inappropriate where the seeking
party is a member of the class that Congress intended to regulate for
purposes of protecting an entirely distinct class—e.g., ERISA plans.101
C.

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to rule in
favor of indemnifying ERISA fiduciaries under the federal common
law, thereby forming the circuit split. In Chemung Canal Trust Co. v.
Sovran Bank/Maryland,102 Fairway Spring Company, Inc. (“Fairway”)
established a retirement plan for its employees.103 The plan allowed
Fairway to appoint a trustee to exercise fiduciary authority over the
plan and its assets.104 Chemung, the plan’s trustee, sued the plan’s
former fiduciary, Sovran, alleging that Sovran breached its duty of
care by continuing imprudent investments that were previously made
by the plan trustee who preceded Sovran.105 Sovran requested
contribution or indemnity, alleging that Chemung adequately failed to
evaluate the plan, thereby contributing to the losses that were subject
to the lawsuit against Sovran.106
98

Id.
Id.
100
Id. at 1433 (quoting Tx. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 639 (1981)).
101
Id.
102
939 F.2d 12 (1991).
103
Id. at 13.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 14.
99
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The Second Circuit first addressed whether ERISA permitted a
claim for contribution or indemnity.107 After noting that Congress did
not expressly provide for either remedy under ERISA, the Second
Circuit quickly dismissed the implied action test devised under Cort v.
Ash.108 The Second Circuit held that applying the Cort test would
automatically dismiss Sovran’s claim because ERISA was enacted to
protect plan participants and not former fiduciaries, such as Sovran.109
As a result, the court addressed whether contribution or
indemnification were available under the federal common law.110
By incorporating the common law trust principles referenced in
ERISA’s legislative history, the court held that the right to contribution
was recognized under ERISA.111 Although the Supreme Court in
Russell dismissed a plan beneficiary’s action to recover damages that
were not expressly authorized under ERISA, the Second Circuit
distinguished Russell on the grounds that the Court did not discuss the
availability of federal common law remedies.112 The Second Circuit
reasoned that Congress’s failure to articulate certain remedies did not
necessarily mean Congress intentionally precluded such remedies.113
Rather, it was more likely Congress simply lost focus of those beyond
the protection of plan participants and beneficiaries.114 Based on these
principles, the court held there was “no reason why a single fiduciary
who [was] only partially responsible for a loss should bear its full
brunt.”115
107

Id. at 15.
Id.
109
Id. In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit under a
federal statute, recall that the first part of the Cort test asks whether the party seeking
the remedy is a member of the class whose benefit the statute was intended to
protect.
110
Id. at 16.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 17-18.
113
Id. at 18.
114
Id.
115
Chemung Canal Tr. Co., 939 F.2d at 16.
108
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The Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit, in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of
America v. IADA Services, Inc.,116 is the most recent federal court of
appeals to deny a fiduciary’s right to contribution under ERISA. In
that case, IADA Services, Inc. (“IADA Services”) performed
administrative and investment services on behalf of an association’s
employee benefit plan.117 After the Department of Labor (“DOL”)
conducted an audit, the DOL alleged that IADA Services violated its
fiduciary duty by charging fees in excess of the plan’s direct
expenses.118 The DOL claimed that IADA Services was a plan
fiduciary because several trustees of the plan also served as directors
for IADA Services.119 Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of
America (“Travelers”), the insurer for the trustees of the plan, settled
the claim on behalf of the trustees.120 Travelers then sued IADA
Services, asserting claims for indemnification and contribution under
ERISA.121
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit in Kim v.
Fujikawa, holding that Section 409 of ERISA does not provide an
equitable remedy of contribution in favor of a breaching fiduciary.122
While the statute indicates that a breaching fiduciary “shall be subject
to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate,”123 the Eighth Circuit held that the remedies under this
provision are to the ERISA plan.124 Similar to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Russell, the court reasoned that the Act only allows for
the possibility of “other equitable or remedial relief” after it declares a
116

497 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 863.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 864.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 866.
123
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
124
IADA Services, Inc., 497 F.3d at 866.
117
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fiduciary liable “to make good to such plan” and “to restore to such
plan” any lost profits.125 Hence, ERISA could not be read to provide
contribution in favor of a breaching fiduciary.126 Moreover, the Eighth
Circuit noted that the statute’s “carefully crafted and detailed
enforcement scheme provide[d] strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly.”127 Notwithstanding the authority to create federal common
law under ERISA, the court was reluctant to alter a reticulated statute
that is backed by a decade of congressional scholarship.128
CHESEMORE V. FENKELL
A.

Factual Background

In the 1990’s, David Fenkell and the companies he controlled—
i.e., Alliance Holdings, Inc. (“Alliance”), A.H.I., Inc. (“AHI”), and AH
Transitions—were in the business of buying and selling companies
with an employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”).129 In a standard
transaction, Fenkell would fold an acquired company’s ESOP into
Alliance’s ESOP, hold the company for a brief period of time, and then
flip the company at a profit.130 Fenkell’s business model was entirely
legal, assuming he complied with his ERISA fiduciary duties.131
Nevertheless, Fenkell breached his fiduciary duties in a particular
125

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)).
Id.
127
Id. (quoting Great–-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 209 (2002)).
128
See id. at 865.
129
Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (“Chesemore I”), 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007,
1012 (W.D. Wis. 2012); Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/esops.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2012)
(“An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a retirement plan in which the
company contributes its stock (or money to buy its stock) to the plan for the benefit
of the company’s employees.”).
130
Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
131
Id.
126
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transaction, where he methodically flipped Trachte Building Systems,
Inc. (“Trachte”) shortly before the company’s stock became
worthless.132
In 2002, Alliance purchased Trachte, a manufacturer of selfstorage systems, for $24 million and merged its ESOP into Alliance’s
ESOP (the “2002 Transaction”).133 All of the Trachte common stock
that was held in the former ESOP (“Old Trachte ESOP”) was swapped
for Alliance common stock, and the Old Trachte ESOP was
dissolved.134 In exchange, the Trachte employees became participants
of the Alliance ESOP, with accounts equal in value to their previous
accounts.135 Fenkell projected that he could later sell Trachte for
roughly $50 million in five years.136
By the time Fenkell was prepared to sell, however, Trachte’s
overall profitability was flat.137 By the end of 2006 and early 2007,
Trachte’s sales revenues were steadily declining and no independent
buyer would purchase Trachte on the open market.138 As a result,
Fenkell offloaded Trachte in a leveraged buyout (the “2007
Transaction”).139 Fenkell created a new Trachte ESOP, where the new
Trachte ESOP bought back the Trachte shares from Alliance in
exchange for a promissory note.140 Next, the Trachte employee
accounts in the Alliance ESOP were spun off to the new Trachte
ESOP.141 The new Trachte ESOP then repaid the promissory notes by
transferring back the Alliance stock to Alliance.142 Fenkell essentially
designed the transaction so that the accounts of the Trachte employees
132

Id.
Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2016).
134
Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
135
Id.
136
Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 806.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 808.
139
Id.
140
Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1037-38.
141
Id.
142
Id.
133
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in the Alliance ESOP were used as leverage to purchase Trachte from
Alliance.143 By the end of the 2007 Transaction, the new Trachte
ESOP had paid $45 million for 100% of Trachte’s equity and incurred
roughly $36 million in debt.144
Trachte was unable to sustain the debt load that it incurred as a
result of the 2007 Transaction.145 Trachte projected six months after
the 2007 Transaction that it was unable to meet its loan covenants.146
By the end of 2008, Tranchte’s equity was worthless.147
B.

Procedural History

A group of current and former Trachte employees filed a classaction lawsuit under ERISA, alleging numerous breaches of fiduciary
duties by Alliance, Fenkell, the Trachte Trustees, and several other
entities.148 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin found the defendants liable.149 Alliance and Fenkell argued
they were only fiduciaries during the spin-off and, therefore, should
not be held accountable.150 This made Trachte responsible for any
decisions made with respect to the plaintiff’s accounts after the spinoff.151 Nevertheless, the court found Alliance and Fenkell acted in
fiduciary capacities throughout the entire 2007 Transaction.152
The court reasoned that Alliance and Fenkell (1) arranged the
2007 Transaction so that it would only benefit them, (2) ensured no
one on the opposite side of the transaction looked out for the new
Trachte ESOP participants, and (3) ensured that those on the opposite
143

Id. at 1054.
Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 807.
145
Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1013.
149
Id. at 1054–57.
150
Id. at 1052.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1054.
144
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side of the transaction would remain liable to Alliance and Fenkell
should they not go through with the 2007 Transaction.153 Moreover,
Alliance and Fenkell made no effort in determining whether the 2007
Transaction was in the best interest of the Trachte employees.154 In
short, the court stated it was a typical example of “heads I win, tails
you lose.”155 As a result, the court held Alliance and Fenkell violated
their fiduciary duties owed to the Trachte employee participants in the
Alliance ESOP.156
After an additional hearing, the judge ordered Alliance and
Fenkell to indemnify the Trachte trustees because Alliance and
Fenkell’s culpability greatly exceeded that of the Trachte trustees.157
The court found that Alliance and Fenkell orchestrated the 2007
Transaction and used their position of authority over the trustees.158
The judge analogized: “Fenkell was the unquestioned conductor and
the Trachte Trustees mere musicians.”159 The Trachte trustees were
subsequently indemnified for any compensatory relief they were
required to pay.160 Fenkell appealed to the Seventh Circuit, mainly
contesting that ERISA did not permit the court to order
indemnification among co-fiduciaries. 161
C.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

In addressing whether indemnification and contribution are
equitable remedies under ERISA, the Seventh Circuit first
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has previously incorporated
153

Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1054–55.
155
Id. at 1052.
156
Id. at 1055.
157
Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (Chesemore II), 948 F. Supp. 2d 928, 94950 (W.D. Wis. 2013).
158
Id. at 949.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 950.
161
Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016).
154
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trust principles under ERISA.162 The Supreme Court has defined
“appropriate equitable relief” as “those categories of relief that,
traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity) were
typically available in equity.”163 Based on this definition, the Seventh
Circuit held the district court’s remedial authority under ERISA
incorporated the law of trusts, which subsequently encompasses the
power to fashion “traditional equitable remedies.”164 Based on this
context, the Seventh Circuit quickly concluded that indemnification
and contribution were among those remedies.165
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that it already addressed this
issue long ago in Free, where the court held that the protections of
Section 1105(b)(1)(B) were not exclusive remedies under ERISA.166
Free recognized that “Congress intended to codify the principles of
trust law with whatever alternations were needed to fit the needs of
employee benefit plans,” which included the right to indemnification
under appropriate circumstances.167 In response, Fenkell argued that
Free was “implicitly overturned” in Summers v. State Street Bank &
Trust Co.,168 where the Seventh Circuit noted in passing that “a right
of contribution” under ERISA “remains an open [question] in this
circuit.”169 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit rejected Fenkell’s

162

Id. at 811; see CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011) (noting
that ERISA commonly treats a plan as a trust and a plan fiduciary “as a trustee”); see
also Tibble v. Edison Intern., 135 S.Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015) (“In determining the
contours of an ERISA fiduciary’s duty, courts often must look to the law of trusts.”);
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts
often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to
interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”).
163
Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 811 (citing CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 439).
164
Id. (citing CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 440).
165
Id. at 812.
166
Id.
167
Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337-38 (1984).
168
453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006).
169
Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 812 (citing Summers, 453 F.3d 404, 413 (7th Cir.
2006)).
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argument, holding that Summers never mentioned Free, let alone
overturned it.170
The Seventh Circuit continued by distinguishing Chesemore from
the Supreme Court’s holding in Russell, where the Supreme Court held
that ERISA does not entitle claimants to punitive damages.171
Although Free and Russell both interpreted Section 409 of ERISA, the
Seventh Circuit held that Russell did not undermine Free.172 The court
greatly simplified its reasoning, noting that an ERISA fiduciary
seeking a right of indemnification is not equivalent to a plan
participant seeking punitive damages under an implied right of action
theory.173 Despite acknowledging the differences between Free and
Russell, the Seventh Circuit failed to explain the distinction and
quickly affirmed that the district court had the authority to indemnify
the Trachte ESOP trustees.174
ARGUMENT
Although the Seventh Circuit has supported the accessibility of
indemnification and contribution as equitable remedies under ERISA,
the court has never explicitly scrutinized this issue under the federal
common law.175 Instead, the Seventh Circuit has analyzed this issue
based on the lower court’s remedial authority. Recall that in Free v.
Brody, the Seventh Circuit held “ERISA grants the courts the power to
shape an award so as to make the injured plan whole while at the same
time apportioning the damages equitably between the wrongdoers.”176
Similarly, in Chesemore v. Fenkell, the court held “the district court
had the authority to order Fenkell to indemnify the new Trachte ESOP
170
171

(1985)).

Id.
Id. at 813 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144

172

Id.
Id.
174
Id.
175
Thomsen & Smith, supra note 77, at 756.
176
Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1984) (emphasis added).
173
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trustees.”177 This is unlike the Ninth Circuit, which definitively held
that contribution and indemnification are not available remedies under
ERISA.178 Although this distinction is subtle, it is important because
the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether there is an
implied right of indemnification or contribution under ERISA.
The Seventh Circuit in Fenkell incorrectly held that the lower
court had the authority to indemnify a co-fiduciary in accordance with
the background principles of trust law.179 Allowing a breaching
fiduciary, which has exploited his position of power to the detriment of
benefit plan participants, to seek equitable remedies is not only unjust,
but contrary to ERISA’s purpose. As described below, the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Fenkell is improper for two reasons: (1) Congress
did not intend to incorporate such equitable remedies; and (2)
contribution is an inefficient remedy that increases the cost of
litigation but not the deterrence for breaching fiduciaries.
A.

Congressional Intent: A Closer Look at ERISA’s Language
and Legislative History

In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court looked to congressional intent
for purposes of creating or denying an implicit right within a federal
statute.180 The Supreme Court stated that a right could only be implied
under a federal statute if congressional intent can be inferred from the
statute’s language, the statutory structure, or from some other
source.181 Therefore, federal courts can only provide ERISA cofiduciaries the equitable right to indemnification or contribution if
Congress intended to incorporate such rights. Analyzing ERISA’s
language and legislative history makes it abundantly clear that
Congress did not intend to extend such privileges to co-fiduciaries.

177

Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 813 (emphasis added).
Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989).
179
See Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 813.
180
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
181
See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985).
178
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A review of the statute’s express language is crucial to this
analysis. The relevant language under ERISA provides that any
breaching fiduciary “with respect to a plan . . . shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan . . . and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.”182 Although the statute does not
explicitly define “other equitable or remedial relief,” examining the
entirety of this provision illustrates that Congress is emphasizing the
relationship between the fiduciary and the plan, not the relationship
among co-fiduciaries.183
Specifically, the statute expressly characterizes a fiduciary’s
relationship as one “with respect to a plan” where a fiduciary is liable
“to such plan.”184 Immediately thereafter, Section 1109(a) provides
that a liable fiduciary may be liable for other relief, such as removal
from the fiduciary’s position.185 By reading Section 1109(a) in its
totality, it seems clear that Congress included the “removal of such
fiduciary” as one example of a plan-related remedy that is permitted
under ERISA, not a remedy among co-fiduciaries.186 Moreover,
nothing under Section 1109(a) expressly indicates that Congress
intended to apportion relief among co-fiduciaries in the form of
indemnification or contribution.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly held that the lower
court had the authority to indemnify a co-fiduciary in accordance with
the background principles of trust law.187 Although ERISA’s fiduciary
responsibility provisions are shaped by the common law of trusts, the
Seventh Circuit in Fenkell mistakenly assumed that Congress
inadvertently omitted a co-fiduciary’s equitable right to contribution
and indemnification. ERISA is the product of over ten years of
congressional scholarship, making it highly unlikely that Congress
182

29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012).
Russell, 473 U.S. at 139.
184
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
185
Id.
186
Russell, 473 U.S. at 142.
187
Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2016).
183
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simply neglected to include equitable remedies under the statute. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly supported this argument, noting that the
statute’s “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides
‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’”188 Moreover,
the reasons for including some equitable remedies while excluding
others—i.e., the right to contribution and indemnification—would be
completely undermined if courts were free to supplement remedies
under state law that Congress deliberately chose not to include. Given
that Congress deliberately excluded a co-fiduciary’s right to
indemnification and contribution, the Seventh Circuit failed to
adequately consider ERISA’s congressional intent in reaching its
decision.
Regardless of the statute’s congressional intent, however, one may
assert that if such equitable remedies are not implied, then cofiduciaries run the risk of sustaining liability that is unequal to their
share of wrongdoing.189 Nevertheless, recall that in determining
whether a right should be implied under a federal statute, the Supreme
Court’s four-part test considers whether the action is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme.190 Here, not only
does ERISA’s legislative history fail to address equitable remedies
among co-fiduciaries, but implying such remedies in favor of a
breaching fiduciary would directly undermine ERISA’s purpose. The
statute was specifically designed to protect plan participants from the
mismanagement of plan assets by requiring fiduciaries to adhere to
various standards of conduct.191 Moreover, fiduciaries are subject to
such liabilities because they act on behalf of plan participants and

188

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (quoting Russell, 473
U.S. at 146–47)).
189
See, e.g., Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2d
Cir. 1991) (“There is no reason why a single fiduciary who is only partially
responsible for a loss should bear its full brunt.”).
190
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
191
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).
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beneficiaries.192 It is the plan participant that suffers as a result of a
fiduciary’s breach of duty, not the co-fiduciary. Therefore, granting
equitable remedies in favor of co-fiduciaries would tilt the scale and
contradict the purpose of ERISA.
B.

The Seventh Circuit Failed to Consider the Economic
Inefficiencies of Contribution

At its core, the right of contribution allows a liable defendant to
recover damages from other liable parties.193 If exercised in
Chesemore v. Fenkell, for example, Fenkell would have had the
opportunity to recover damages from the other breaching fiduciaries,
such as the new Trachte ESOP trustees. Although this remedy was not
ordered by the court, the Seventh Circuit held the district court had the
authority to order ERISA fiduciaries to provide indemnification and
contribution to co-fiduciaries in accordance with trust law
principles.194 From a policy standpoint, however, one major
efficiency-based criticism with this holding is that allowing
contribution among liable co-fiduciaries increases the cost of litigation
without simultaneously increasing deterrence.195
As previously mentioned, ERISA fiduciaries must comply with
their primary duties—i.e., the duty of loyalty, the duty of prudence, the
duty of diversification, and the duty to follow plan documents—for
purposes of avoiding liability.196 A fiduciary may nonetheless be liable
for another fiduciary for (1) knowingly concealing the other’s breach,
(2) enabling the other’s breach, or (3) not making reasonable efforts to
192

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 2
(2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/ouractivities/resource-center/publications/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf.
193
Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 866 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ill.
2007).
194
Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2016).
195
See Di Cola, supra note 52, at 1553.
196
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (outlining the various fiduciary duties under
ERISA).
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remedy the other’s breach if he has knowledge of it.197 Hence, once
one fiduciary complies with his statutory obligations, the other
fiduciaries are encouraged to comply because any fiduciary that is
subsequently liable for a breach would have to bear 100% of the
damages.198
Notably, providing a co-fiduciary the right to contribution under
ERISA does not change this outcome.199 “So long as the sum of all
tortfeasors’ expected shares of the total loss is 100%, the incentives for
efficient accident avoidance are the same under contribution or nocontribution.”200 In other words, the total damage or loss resulting
from a breaching fiduciary or fiduciaries is always the same,
regardless of whether the damages are apportioned by contribution. By
analogy, it would be the same thing as asking whether one prefers
eating a whole pizza, or the same pizza cut into eight different slices.
Regardless of what you choose, the amount of pizza is the same, just
as the loss is the same. Because each fiduciary will theoretically still
comply with his statutory obligations for purposes of avoiding
liability, contribution does not change the overall level of deterrence.
The only thing that does change, however, is the transaction costs
among multiple injurers.201 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit did not
take this into consideration in reaching its decision.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The issue of whether ERISA co-fiduciaries can seek contribution
and indemnification as equitable remedies is a question of statutory
interpretation. ERISA expressly assigns liabilities to plan fiduciaries,
yet fails to include whether fiduciary liabilities may be allocated
among other parties in relation to a single judgment. ERISA’s
legislative history similarly lacks any explanation or reference to this
197

Id. § 1105(a).
See Di Cola, supra note 52, at 1553.
199
See id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
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issue. Moreover, the few federal courts of appeal that have addressed
this issue have taken various and inconsistent positions as to whether
such remedies should be implied.
The Seventh Circuit in Fenkell recently ruled on this issue, where
it incorrectly held that the lower court had the authority to indemnify
co-fiduciaries under ERISA.202 Although ERISA incorporates certain
aspects of trust law principles, it does not include all of them—i.e., the
right to contribution and indemnification. The statute was objectively
designed to protect participants and beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans from fiduciary mismanagement. A plain reading of the statute
further supports this argument, where Congress clearly highlighted the
relational concern between fiduciaries and their respective plans,
rather than the relationship between co-fiduciaries. The fact that
Congress chose to include some equitable remedies and not others is
further evidence that such remedies were purposely omitted.203 As a
result, the Seventh Circuit’s failure to properly incorporate the
meaning of ERISA’s language and legislative history contravenes
Congress’s intent and risks subjecting lower courts to unnecessary
litigation costs in the future.
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